Chinese Military Aircraft: Getting Better... Up to a Point

Chinese aircraft are a mixed story. Historically, the country has operated and sold a variety of legacy aircraft that can be charitably termed “inadequate”. But in recent years, this has been changing, with considerable resources provided to create a series of fourth and fifth generation aircraft.

The most obvious manifestation of this change was the recent unveiling of the J-20, touted as a stealth, fifth-generation design with almost no rationale for either claim. Previously referred to by the US military as the J-XX, the J-20 entered service in early 2018, if only in theory. Its appearance also offers no evidence that China has developed the key enabling technologies for modern fighters. The only thing we know is that its airframe looks modern, compared with other Chinese designs. But it’s very difficult to reconcile large moving canards with low observability.

The J-20 is best regarded as a technology demonstrator. It may never be deployed. But the country has made progress. In October 2012 the Shenyang J-31 made its first flight, not long after it was spotted being driven around on a truck. A second prototype flew in December 2016. Even if it won’t be operational for another five to 10 years, this plane looks a lot more serious than the J-20. It at least externally echoes an F-35, inspiring dark (and quite possibly accurate) talk of F-35 cyber theft by China.

Meanwhile, China’s first truly new aircraft, the single-engine multi-role Chengdu (AVIC-1) J-10/F-10, possibly using technology from Israel’s Lavi program, made its first flight in March 1998. In May 2007 China ordered 100 Salyut AL-31FN engines from Russia as powerplants. Mass production began in 2008. The plan was to have 200+ in service by 2010, with an ultimate requirement for 300. As of 2015, China had over 200, and by late 2021 the total was over 480. China also an­nounced that it was working on ad­vanced J-10 variants, including twinjet, but this has gone nowhere. But in May 2021 the first PLAAF unit was formed with J-10s powered by indigenous WS-10 engines. Ef­forts to export the type have yielded an apparent sale of six to traditional customer Pakistan.

China’s Chengdu is also cooperat­ing with Pakistan on the FC-1, a multi-role fighter based on the can­celled Chengdu/Grumman Super 7. It’s basically a MiG-21 with a MiG-29 engine (the RD-93, although it might be replaced with a Chinese-built engine). The FC-1 is going ahead, although it has turned into a less capable export version of the J­10. Pakistan (where it is known as the JF-17 Thunder) might be the only customer. The FC-1/JF-17 has been delayed, with European companies balking at providing radars and avi­onics (Pakistan's FC-1s have Chinese radars) and Russia balking at provid­ing engines. However, FC-1 produc­tion was officially launched in Janu­ary 2003, and the first production plane rolled out in May 2003. Deliv­eries to Pakistan began in early 2008, with ten delivered by 2010 and 24 by 2012. The last of the first batch of 50 was delivered in December 2013, and deliveries of the next 50 – Block 2 – began right after. A rumored sale of FC-1s to Argentina in late 2022 was subsequently denied by the Argentina’s president.

The J-10 shows that China has made considerable strides in terms of airframe technology. It represents a considerable leap ahead from earlier Chinese aircraft designs, although its contemporary, the JF-17, harkens back to the past, when numbers mat­tered more than quality; of course, they may be twin sons from different mothers. The PLAAF will likely fo­cus on Sukhoi derivatives, J-10s, and next generation machines, while the JF-17 will be used as foreign aid for less sophisticated client states.

From the standpoint of actual military capabilities (rather than technological achievement), the best part of the PLAAF is its Sukhoi fight­ers. China has purchased several hun­dred of these (see report). Su-27 var­iants built by Shenyang are desig­nated J-11. Starting in the mid-2000s, China began procuring J-11Bs, which are Su-27s with purely indige­nous content — radars, engines, cockpits, etc.

China’s military aviation industry suffers from one fundamental prob­lem: they’re fixated on the aircraft themselves. More sophisticated pow­ers look at what’s inside an airframe, in terms of radars, engines, weapons, sensor fusion, information manage­ment, and EW packages. Sophisti­cated powers also look at what’s out­side the airframe, in terms of com­mand-and-control systems, data links and network architectures, doctrine, and training programs.

This is where China is stumbling. They’re on the right track in terms of airframes, and they’ve done some impressive work on precision guided munitions, but the rest badly needs work, or is completely lacking alto­gether. Any discussion of a fighter’s fifth-generation status starts with (a) recognition that “fifth generation” re­fers largely to technology beneath the skin of an aircraft and (b) admission that we have very little idea about the technologies lurking inside the J-20 and J-31 airframes.

For example, China has only the most rudimentary air-to-air refueling capabilities, and are still trying to de­velop a working airborne early warn­ing system. They are a long way from creating a robust battle management network. Key enablers like these are what make an air force great. With­out them, it’s just a collection of planes, good and bad.

Similarly, China lacks truly so­phisticated subsystems capabilities. Building a copy of a Sukhoi jet is one thing. Building a reliable and capable AESA radar or a powerful and dura­ble jet engine is quite another. It’s the building blocks that have kept China from successfully replicating Sukhoi fighters in large numbers. Even stranger, China refers to the J-20 as a fifth-generation fighter, but with only very limited reference to the subsys­tems that make a fighter truly fifth-generation. Getting outside help with aircraft design and integration is pos­sible. But getting outside help with advanced subsystems and all of those enablers is quite difficult, if not im­possible.